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Abstract—With the increase in use of Unmanned Aerial Vehi-
cles (UAVs)/drones, it is important to detect and identify causes
of failure in real time for proper recovery from a potential
crash-like scenario or post incident forensics analysis. The cause
of crash could be either a fault in the sensor/actuator system,
a physical damage/attack, or a cyber attack on the drone’s
software. In this paper, we propose novel architectures based
on deep Convolutional and Long Short-Term Memory Neural
Networks (CNNs and LSTMs) to detect (via Autoencoder) and
classify drone mis-operations based on sensor data. The proposed
architectures are able to learn high-level features automatically
from the raw sensor data and learn the spatial and temporal
dynamics in the sensor data. We validate the proposed deep-
learning architectures via simulations and experiments on a real
drone. Empirical results show that our solution is able to detect
(with over 90% accuracy) and classify various types of drone
mis-operations (with about 99% accuracy (simulation data) and
upto 88% accuracy (experimental data)).
I. INTRODUCTION
Overview and Motivation: The advancement in the tech-
nology of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)/drones and con-
cern of safety are pushing many government and defense orga-
nizations to use UAVs for surveillance. E-shopping companies
like Amazon are planning to use UAVs for home delivery
of their products. Further, drones are also being planned
for use as mobile air-policing vehicles in some countries.
The advantage that drones can replace humans in potentially
dangerous situations is the main factor behind investing and
researching on UAVs.
Drones or UAVs are Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) with
the increase of which, there are risks of both physical as well
as cyber attacks on them [1]. Examples of cyber attacks are
GPS spoofing attacks [2], signal jamming, control command
attacks, attacks on sensors [3], keylogging virus, etc. Examples
of physical attacks (both unintentional and intentional) are bird
hits, abrupt wind changes, broken propellers, etc. Large sized
drones/UAVs are capable of killing people if they fall from
heights due to the massive potential energy possessed by them.
The increase in use of drones/UAVs currently and in projected
future makes real-time incident analysis for drones or UAVs
a priority. The hobbyists owning drones/UAVs, researchers
and the government all will be more curious to know the
cause that prevented UAVs from not reaching its destination or
deviated from its intended path. As such UAV fault/anomaly
detection as well as cause identification are important. Firstly
it is important to detect when the UAV’s operation deviates
from the normal. Once it is determined that something is
anomalous, more resources can be utilized to identify the
cause. Identifying reasons for failure is important so that
appropriate action can be taken to minimize further loss.
For example, in the case of a car, knowing that the failure
is caused by a flat tire will help to avoid actions such as
sudden braking which will further exacerbate the situation
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Fig. 1: An overview of our proposed on-board deep-learning based UAV fault
detection and identification/classification framework.
(as it results in loss of control). Similarly in case of a flying
object, for certain failures, gliding may be the best solution
instead of the much obvious landing. On the other hand
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based data driven techniques are
increasingly being used to solve many complex problems
relating to autonomous vehicles [4–7], smartphones [8–11],
etc.
Our Approach: Direct and continuous analysis of sensor
data for real-time identification of faults is not recommended
due to two reasons—(i) it is computationally prohibitive espe-
cially on resource constrained devices such as UAVs as it re-
quires processing huge set of sensor data; (ii) it requires signif-
icant amount of precious on-board memory resources to store
the real-time stream of sensor data. Hence, considering the
resource constraints [12–15] of these devices, we adopt a two-
step approach (Fig. 1) where in the identification/classification
step is carried out only if an anomalous behavior is detected in
the sensor data. Unlike the previous works which are mostly
model-based [16], we follow a completely (sensor) data-driven
approach (using UAV Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensor
data such as accelerometer, gyroscope, etc.) for both detection
and identification steps.
The reason for choosing data-driven approach (such as deep
learning techniques) over traditional model-based approaches
are as follows. Deep learning techniques—(a) have ability
to learn complex patterns especially non-linear functions; the
sensor data of a UAV at times of potential crash events (such
as broken propeller) is highly non-linear and complex in
nature; (b) have no requirement to manually design the features
from the data—the layers in a deep network learn meaningful
features on their own during the training process. This also
translates to another advantage of not needing domain exper-
tise to extract the features; (c) can work with unlabeled data in
unsupervised fashion to generate features. This is very much
beneficial for crash-like scenarios due to scarce availability of
labelled data. To this end, we propose a novel Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) and Bidirectional-Long Short Term
Memory (Bi-LSTM) deep neural network based autoencoder
for detection of faults/anomalous patterns followed by a CNN-
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LSTM deep network for their classification/identification.
Our Contributions: The main contributions are as follows.
• We propose a novel Convolutional Neural Net-
work (CNN) and Bidirectional Long Short Term Mem-
ory (Bi-LSTM) based deep autoencoder network archi-
tecture for real-time detection of anomalous patterns in
UAV IMU sensor data.
• We propose a novel CNN and LSTM based deep neural
network classifier for real-time identification of the (cause
of) fault/attack/crash based on the UAV IMU sensor data.
• We induce crash scenarios by modifying the firmware
internals of both the AirSim drone simulator as well as
a real drone [17].
• We validate the proposed models via both experiments
and simulations. According to the results, our solution is
able to detect anomalies with over 90% accuracy and can
classify drone mis-operations correctly with about 99%
(simulation) and upto 85% accuracy (experimental data).
Paper Organization: In Sect. II, we review related work. In
Sect. III, we describe the proposed deep-learning based UAV
fault/crash detection and identification methods. In Sect. IV,
we present both experimental and simulation results. Finally,
in Sect. V, we conclude the paper and sketch future work.
II. RELATED WORK
We position our work with respect to the related work that
can be classified into the following categories.
Fault Detection and Identification (FDI): Much of the ex-
isting work on FDI focuses on faults in sensors/actuators in the
UAV. For example, Panitsrisit et al. [18] propose a hardware
duplication system consisting of piezoresistive sensor, pressure
sensor, and current sensors to detect faults in the elevator of
the UAV. Any abnormal outputs from these sensors will be
detected as a failure. Rago et al. [19] present a FDI method for
the failure of sensors/actuators based on Interacting Multiple-
Model (IMM) Kalman Filter approach. Actuator/sensor fail-
ures are represented by a change in the model representing the
dynamics (measurements) of the system. Drozeski et al. [20]
present an FDI method using three-layer feed-forward neural
network based on state information. Heredia et al. [21] uses
Observer/Kalman Identification (OKID) estimator to estimate
the system state from measured input-output data. Detection
of faults is done by noting deviation from the expected output
beyond an accepted threshold. They use a separate estimator
for each output to make the identification problem trivial.
Taking a different approach, Suarez et al. [22] use kalman
filtering in combination with visual techniques such as 3D
projection from two observers to detect faults in the target
UAV in a multi-UAV setting.
Anomaly Detection: Anomaly detection is generally an
unsupervised machine learning (ML) technique due to lack
of sufficient examples for the anomalous class. Within un-
supervised learning, it can be broadly classified into the
following categories —statistical/regression, dimensionality
reduction and distribution-based approaches. In statistical ap-
proaches [23], features are generally hand-made from the
data such as mean, variance, entropy, etc. Certain statistical
tests/formal rule checking actions are performed on these
features to determine if the data is anomalous. However these
approaches work only when the anomalous patterns are known
apriori so they can be monitored on the sensor data. In
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Fig. 2: (Top) After the model is trained, we fit the reconstruction errors to a
multivariate gaussian model. (Bottom) Given a test data point, we first find
the reconstruction error and then find the mahalanobis distance of this point
w.r.t. the fitted gaussian distribution. Top scores can be analyzed as needed.
dimensionality reduction, the data is projected onto a low-
dimensional representation (such as principal components in
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)). The idea is that, this
low-dimensional representation captures the most important
features of the input data. Then clustering techniques such as
k-means or Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) are used to
cluster these low-dimensional features to identify anomalies.
In distribution-based approaches, the training data is fit to
a distribution (such as multi-variate gaussian distribution or
a mixture of them). Then given a test point, distance is
calculated of this test point from the fitted distribution (e.g.,
Mahalanobis distance) that represents the measure of anomaly.
Deep-learning Approaches: Deep-learning techniques
have been widely used to solve many problems in different
domains. For example, deep neural network architectures have
been used to predict seizures [24], deep CNNs have been
used extensively in content recommendation [25], speech
recognition [26], computer vision [27], etc. On the other
hand, RNNs and LSTMs have been used for Model Predictive
Control based robotic manipulation [28], language model-
ing [29], phoneme recognition [30], etc. To the authors’ best
knowledge, deep learning techniques have never been used
to detect/identify the cause of the UAV crashes based on
sensor data. In this paper, we propose novel deep learning
architectures to detect and identify the cause of UAV crashes
or crash-like scenarios from drone’s IMU sensor data.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we first explain our CNN Bi-LSTM autoen-
coder network to detect anomalies followed by CNN-LSTM
network classifier to identify anomalies/crash scenarios.
CNN and Bi-LSTM based Detector (‘AutoEnc’):
Anomaly detection using unsupervised learning consists of
two steps. In step 1, the system is trained with several
normal examples to learn representations of the input data
e.g., GMM clustering. Because we are dealing with temporal
data, a sliding window approach needs to be adopted to learn
these representations. In step 2, given a test data point, we
define an anomaly score based on the learned representations,
e.g., distance from the mean of the cluster. In an LSTM
autoencoder, input time series data, {x0, x1, ...xn}, of size
n+ 1 (corresponding to one window of data segmented from
full data) is fed to the encoders which consist of n + 1
LSTM cells. The output of the last LSTM cell—called the
embedding—is fed as input to a series of n+1 LSTM cells to
generate an output, {a0, a1, ...an}. The autoencoder is trained
by minimizing the reconstruction error, |x− a|2 (step 1).
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Fig. 3: Convolutional and Bi-LSTM encoder (top) and decoder (bottom) of
the proposed autoencoder.
Convolutional Bi-LSTM Encoder: The basic encoder in an
LSTM autoencoder does not perform sufficiently well as it
not does take into account: (i) inter channel/modal correlations
(ii) directionality of data. We design an encoder that addresses
these issues as shown in Fig. 3(top). It consists of a series of 1-
dimensional (1D) convolutional layers followed by bi-LSTM
layers. The convolutional layers help in capturing inter-channel
spatial correlations, while the LSTM layers help in capturing
inter- and intra-channel temporal correlations. The number of
filters, the size of filter kernel and the type of padding (with
a default stride length of 1) is indicated in Fig. 3(top). For
example, in the first convolution step, 48 filters of size 5× 1
are applied to the input data of size, 25×1×6 (assuming a 6-
channel input data), to result in an output of size, 25×1×48.
Unidirectional LSTM layers capture temporal patterns only in
one-direction, while the data might exhibit interesting patterns
in both directions. Hence to capture these patterns, we have
a second set of LSTM cells for which the data is fed in the
reverse order. Further, we have multiple layers of these bi-
LSTM layers to extract more hierarchical information. All the
data that has been processed through multiple convolutional
and bi-LSTM layers is available in the cell states of final
LSTM cells. This is the output of the encoder which will be
fed as input to our decoder.
Convolutional Bi-LSTM Decoder: The decoder performs
encoder operations in reverse order so as to reconstruct the
input data (Fig. 3(bottom)). It first consists of bi-LSTM layers
which take the final cell states from encoder as one of the
inputs (the other input being zero). Other input (other than
the previous cell state) can be either zero or the output of the
previous LSTM cell. The outputs of LSTM layers are fed as
input to a series of 1D de-convolutional layers which perform
reverse of convolution (also called transposed convolution) to
generate data with same shape as that of input data to encoder
(6-channel 1D data of length 25).
Though reconstruction error can directly be used as a
measure of anomaly for step 2, we design an enhanced method
with further processing to obtain better results (Fig. 2). After
the network is trained, the train data is again fed to the
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Fig. 4: Proposed deep CNN and Bi-LSTM architecture for fault classification.
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Fig. 5: Sensor data corresponding to broken propeller scenario.
trained network to capture the reconstruction errors. These
errors are then fit to a multivariate gaussian distribution. Given
a test data point, the reconstruction error is first calculated
using the trained model. Mahalanobis distance of the error
is then calculated with respect to the fitted gaussian model
using the formula shown in Fig. 2. These distances, which are
considered anomaly scores are then sorted in decreasing order
and analyzed as per requirements e.g., analyze top 0.01%.
CNN and LSTM based Classifier (‘DCLNN’): We con-
sider the drone’s sensor signatures in crash or crash-like
scenarios to be very valuable. These signatures are mostly
unique to the events that caused them. As such, we claim
that these signatures can be used to identify those events by
building a classifier mapping sensor signatures to events that
caused them. For example, the data collected from the 3DR
Solo drone [31] after a propeller was broken is shown in Fig. 5.
The plots show that the drone was at stable state when one of
its propellers was broken, this resulted in large variations in
the accelerometer and pitch-roll-yaw data (unique signatures)
since the drone accelerates in a particular direction after the
thrust on the broken propeller is zero. These signatures are
zoomed to show the variation. Other sensor data such as
gyroscope show similar variations.
We propose a novel CNN and Bi-LSTM based architecture
to classify the sensor data in real-time to identify any potential
crash scenarios. This is useful in two ways—(a) it can be used
for recovery planning to stabilize the drone using either redun-
dant hardware or designing appropriate controller techniques
that work only based on less than usual number of actuators;
(b) in cases where the crash is unavoidable, the logged sensor
data can be used to identify the cause of the crash offline.
The proposed deep architecture is shown in Fig. 4. It consists
of convolutional layers in the beginning as in the case of
‘AutoEnc’ to extract important static/spatial features followed
by LSTM layers to capture the dynamic/temporal variations
in the sensor data. As such the encoder layers in Fig. 3 can
be reused as shown in both Fig. 4 and Fig. 1. At every
convolutional layer, each channel is processed by multiple
kernels/filters resulting in those many feature maps in the
subsequent layer. The output of the convolutional layers is
time-wise unrolled and passed through bi-LSTM layers to
capture the temporal dependencies in both directions. The
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6: (a) Training reconstruction loss across each channel and combined data (experimental data); Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for
different number of channels and window sizes—(b) experimental data; (c) simulation data.
concatenated outputs (of forward and backward LSTM layers)
are then passed through a series of fully connected layers
ending in the softmax layer (of length equal to number of
classes) that computes the probabilities of different classes.
We do not use pooling layers after convolutional layers as our
input data has been segmented into windows and the output of
the convolutional layers need to be passed through time-series
LSTM layers [32]. We also introduce dropout at several layers
in our architectures wherein, some of the activations chosen
randomly are made zero. This will act as regularization and
help prevent the network to depend on some idiosyncrasies
and instead learn the general structure.
Real-time operation. Once the models are trained offline,
detection and (if necessary) identification can be done in real-
time as it comprises only of segmenting the streaming sensor
data and applying a few matrix multiplications to arrive at the
result. Identification step is carried out only if the anomaly
scores from detection step is beyond a threshold. Once the
cause is identified/diagnosed in real-time, appropriate actions
can be taken to stabilize/safeguard the drone operation.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first present our experimental and simula-
tion setup followed by detection and identification results. For
each case, we compare our approach with traditional machine
learning classifiers such as SVM.
Experimental Setup. Crash data in Fig. 5 is collected
using 3DR Solo drone. However, we could not use the same
drone for experiments as it weighs 1500 grams and easily gets
damaged when it falls from heights. This is more relevant in
the case of deep learning where more amount of data needs
to be collected to train the models. For this purpose, we
used another small drone, called CrazyFlie 2.0 [17], shown
in Fig. 7(a) weighing just 37 grams and much more robust
to falls. In order to evaluate our approach, we considered
a total of 15 crash scenarios (classes)—all combinations of
one/two/three/four propeller breakdown cases. We modified
the drone firmware by assigning a value of zero to the variables
representing the propeller Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) at
appropriate levels within the software to induce crash. How-
ever, due to firmware limitations, we could not successfully
induce the following cases—all four cases of three-propeller
breakdown and 2 cases of diagonal two-propeller breakdown,
resulting in only 9 classes totally. We collected the data for
30 runs; in each run, the drone would have a 2 second
upflight time, an 8 seconds of hovering time followed by
crash corresponding to one of the 9 classes. We collected
Accelerometer, Gyroscope and Magnetometer data sampled at
100 Hz (maximum supported rate) for each crash event.
Training Description. We used 70% of data for training
and 30% for testing in both experiments and simulations. Since
our data is time-series, we processed it into windows of size
100, 50, 25 timesteps with a stride length of 10 for suitable
analysis. All the data till the crash is used for training/testing
AutoEnc as it considered normal operation. Transition data at
the time of crash is used for training/testing DCLNN along
with corresponding class label (i.e., crash scenario mentioned
above). We used tensorflow to build, train and test our models
with a minibatch size of 512 windows. The number and the
size of filters used for CNN layers is as shown in Fig. 3.
We used two-layers of bi-LSTMs with a hidden size of 256
units for each LSTM cell. We trained the overall network for
100− 300 epochs using Adam optimizer [33] with a learning
rate of 0.01 and epsilon value of 0.01.
Detection Results. Fig. 6(a) shows the training reconstruc-
tion loss of the experimental data for our AutoEnc model
over several training epochs for 6-channels (accelerometer and
gyroscope) individually and in combined form. We can notice
that as the model learns, the reconstruction loss decreases
and converges. We considered detection as a binary problem.
Fig. 6(b) shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve for the experimental data compared with SVM classifier
(with best parameters: Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel,
C = 10, γ = 0.1). We can notice that: (i) accuracy increases
as the number of channels or the window size considered is
increased; (ii) AutoEnc performs better than SVM except for
the 3-channel, 25 window size case. We believe the reason is
due to lack of sufficient data for training AutoEnc (as AutoEnc
is a deep learning network more data is required to train the
model). For the same reason, this behavior is not observed
in 6-channel case. Fig. 6(c) shows the ROC curve results for
our simulation data (we describe the simulator setup and data
collection below). We can observe accuracy greater than 97%
and also notice that we do not observe the similar problem
observed in experimental data.
As can be observed from these experimental results, the
detection accuracy can still be improved. We believe the reason
for this is the unstable nature of our drone (Crazyflie 2.0) used
for experiments. As the drone is very light weight (only 37
grams) and hard to control, it exhibits a certain element of
randomness. This is also reflected in crash signatures making
it hard for the network to learn meaningful representations
as we show below for experimental data. On the other hand,
we are also restricted in using larger drones due to—(i) state
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7: (a) Crazyflie 2.0 drone used for experiments. (b) Accuracy using Magnetometer data. (c) Comparison of test accuracy across different channels.
laws prohibiting flying drones outdoors without an expensive
license and it is very risky to fly these drones indoors; (ii)
these drones get easily damaged when they fall from heights
making them unsuitable for crash experiments. To find a
sweet spot between these two extremes, we decided to use
a realistic drone simulator to circumvent these problems.
We felt the simulation should not be simplistic, ignoring
the physical aspects including environmental objects such as
trees and poles, kinematics such as drag, fiction and gravity,
etc. For these reasons, we adopted Microsoft’s AirSim drone
simulator [34] which is an open-source simulator written in
C++. The simulator tries to simulate the real-world as closely
as possible by trying to include all effects involved including
collisions (see Fig. 8(a) for a screenshot of the simulator).
Simulator Setup. We first describe the simulator architec-
ture followed by data collection method.
Simulator Architecture: The core components of AirSim
include environment model, vehicle model, physics engine,
sensor models, rendering interface, public API layer and an
interface layer for vehicle firmware as depicted in Figure 8(b).
It is necessary to have simulated environments have reasonable
details. For this purpose, AirSim leverages rendering technolo-
gies implemented by Unreal engine [35]. In addition, AirSim
also utilizes the underlying pipeline in the Unreal engine to
detect collisions. The AirSim code base is implemented as a
plugin for the Unreal engine. For in-depth details on different
realistic models used in the simulator, please refer [34].
Inducing Crash: In order to simulate a broken propeller,
we make its RPM to zero by supplying zero current to its
motor. However, for this to work successfully, it is necessary
to constantly provide zero current to the effected motor. A one-
time operation would not be sufficient as the currents to the
motors are generated in a high-frequency update loop using
a PID controller and hence correct current values (which do
not induce crash) are provided to the motors in subsequent
update loops. Hence, we modified the firmware code to make
the effected propeller’s motor current to zero inside the update
loop itself so that its RPM is continuously zero, resulting in
a crash. Fig. 8(c) shows the accelerometer data (x,y,z axes)
after the crash is induced by making the RPM of one of
the propellers to zero. By comparing with the actual drone
crash data (accelerometer) from 3DR Solo drone in Fig. 5, we
can see that the simulation data is more complex and hence
difficult to learn than the former. We successfully simulated
all 15 crash scenarios (classes). In all these scenarios, we
collected 18-channel data viz., linear and angular versions
of acceleration, velocity, and position along all the three
axes from the start of the crash until the end. We repeated
this experiment 300 times to account for noises and gather
sufficient data. We have included the video demo of the
crash experiments run in AirSim simulator along with this
submission. For results below, we used only 3-channel linear
acceleration data (instead of all 18 channels), unless otherwise
specified, as there is a need to limit the amount of data to
process on a real drone.
Identification/Classification Results. We used our
DCLNN architecture in Fig. 4 with three convolutional layers
([48, 64, 96] filters with kernel sizes [5, 5, 3]) followed by two
bi-directional LSTM layers (128 units) and one dense/softmax
layer. The training is performed for 15 epochs in mini-batches
of size 64 using Adam optimizer and categorical cross entropy
as loss function. We now present identification results using
experimental data.
Comparison with SVM. Fig. 7(b) shows the accuracy of
our model (DCLNN) compared against classical machine
learning classifier such as Support Vector Machine (SVM).
Accuracy is defined as the percentage of windows classified
correctly. We can notice that DCLNN’s accuracy increases as
the training is carried out over several epochs (cross-entropy
loss also reduces accordingly but is not plotted due to space
limitations), reaching to 70% finally. We can also notice that
it performs better than SVM classifier (RBF kernel, C = 10,
γ = 0.01), which could only achieve 54% accuracy. Due
to space limitations, we have shown comparison only with
Magnetometer data; in other channels too, DCLNN performs
better than SVM in a similar manner.
Variation with Channels. There is a need to limit the amount
of data processed during inference considering the resource
scarcity of UAVs. We were curious if all the channels con-
tributed equally to the learning of the network. For this
purpose, we trained our network by giving different channel
data each time and plotting accuracy on test data as shown
in Fig. 7(c). We can notice that in 3-channel scenario, Mag-
netometer performs best with 70% accuracy, while combining
all 9-channel data yields an accuracy of about 85%. We now
present results corresponding to simulation data.
Comparison with SVM. Fig. 9(a) shows the training and
testing loss as our network is trained over several epochs. We
notice that the loss reduces and converges to a value. This
indicates that the network is learning over time and fits the
data reasonably. Fig. 9(b) shows the accuracy of our model
(DCLNN) compared against SVM. Interestingly, after only 3
epochs, DCLNN almost converged with about 90% accuracy
(with final value around 93%). The test accuracy also finally
converges to 93%, whereas SVM classifier (RBF kernel, C =
100, γ = 0.01) achieves only 85% accuracy. We did not plot
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8: (a) A snapshot from AirSim shows an aerial vehicle flying in an urban environment. The inset shows depth, object segmentation and front camera
streams generated in real time. (b) The architecture of the system that depicts the core components and their interactions. (c) Three-dimensional accelerometer
data after one of the propeller’s RPM is made zero (simulating broken propeller crash).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9: (a) Cross-entropy loss vs. number of training epochs for both train data and test data. (b) Accuracy vs. number of training epochs compared between
DCLNN (ours) and SVM classifier for both train and test data. (c) Accuracy on test data when the channel data fed to the network is varied.
TABLE I: Inference Times for AutoEnc on different hardware.
No. Chans. Desktop
(Training)
Desktop
(Inference)
RaspberryPi
(Inference)
Jetson TX2
(Inference)
1 (x/y/z) 202 ms 82 ms 312 ms 83 ms
2 (xy/yz/xz) 386 ms 87 ms 372 ms 92 ms
3 (xyz) 561 ms 95 ms 484 ms 101 ms
F1-score as our class distribution is equal.
Variation with Channels. Fig. 9(c) shows the variation with
channel data. We can see that 3-channel gyroscope data works
better (with about 98% accuracy) than 3-channel accelerometer
(93% accuracy) data. Within 3-channel gyroscope, we can
notice that axes Y and Z give better performance than axis
X. By knowing this, we can discard axis X data and only
process axes Y and Z to limit the amount of computation. We
can see that axes Y and Z combined can give an accuracy of
about 87% accuracy, which could be sufficient in some cases.
Raspberry-Pi and Nvidia Jetson Profling. The above results
are obtained on a desktop computer with Intel QuadCore i7-
2600 3.4 GHz processor with 8GB RAM. However, we wanted
to know how long it takes to do inference on hardware that
can be mounted on a drone and powered using a drone battery.
For this purpose, we considered two embedded computing
devices—Raspberry Pi 3 Model B and Nvidia Jetson TX2
module, both of which can be mounted on a drone to augment
its computing capabilities. The former has a QuadCore 1.2
GHz Broadcom BCM2837 processor with 1GB RAM, the
latter has Quadcore 2 GHz ARM processor with 8GB of
CUDA-compatible graphic memory. The results are shown in
Table I. The numbers indicate the time taken to do inference
on a single window of data (100 samples) with the specified
number of channels and the hardware. These numbers show
that AutoEnc is amenable for real-time inference on a drone
aiding in detection of potentially danger modes. Specifically,
we can observe that in the case of Nvidia Jetson TX2, the
results are impressive around 100 ms or less, which means
the drone can do inference on the last one second of sensor
data every 100 ms. It is to be noted that, while new sensor data
is sampled/generated every 10 ms, it may not be necessary to
do the inference at the same speed.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed novel deep architectures to detect and identify
the cause of the malfunction. We have shown that the proposed
architecture is able to achieve over 90% accuracy for detection
and upto 85% accuracy for identification over experimental
data (all-channels combined) and 99% over simulation data
(just 3-channels).
As future work, we plan to test our model on more crash/attack
scenarios e.g., partially broken but functional propellers, cyber
attacks, etc. We also plan on testing our models on heteroge-
neous UAV platforms to assess their generalizability potential.
Later, we will develop real-time decision making techniques
to safeguard the drone from the identified misoperation.
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